{"version":"1.0","provider_name":"Sudan Democracy Action Project","provider_url":"https:\/\/democracyactionsd.org\/en","title":"Academic Research: The Interests of Russia in Sudan - \u0645\u0634\u0631\u0648\u0639 \u0627\u0644\u0633\u0648\u062f\u0627\u0646 \u0644\u0644\u0639\u0645\u0644 \u0627\u0644\u062f\u064a\u0645\u0642\u0631\u0627\u0637\u064a","type":"rich","width":600,"height":338,"html":"<blockquote class=\"wp-embedded-content\" data-secret=\"eF6v2KdTqa\"><a href=\"https:\/\/democracyactionsd.org\/en\/the-interests-of-russia-in-sudan\/\">Academic Research: The Interests of Russia in Sudan<\/a><\/blockquote><iframe sandbox=\"allow-scripts\" security=\"restricted\" src=\"https:\/\/democracyactionsd.org\/en\/the-interests-of-russia-in-sudan\/embed\/#?secret=eF6v2KdTqa\" width=\"600\" height=\"338\" title=\"&#8220;Academic Research: The Interests of Russia in Sudan&#8221; &#8212; \u0645\u0634\u0631\u0648\u0639 \u0627\u0644\u0633\u0648\u062f\u0627\u0646 \u0644\u0644\u0639\u0645\u0644 \u0627\u0644\u062f\u064a\u0645\u0642\u0631\u0627\u0637\u064a\" data-secret=\"eF6v2KdTqa\" frameborder=\"0\" marginwidth=\"0\" marginheight=\"0\" scrolling=\"no\" class=\"wp-embedded-content\"><\/iframe><script>\n\/*! This file is auto-generated *\/\n!function(d,l){\"use strict\";l.querySelector&&d.addEventListener&&\"undefined\"!=typeof URL&&(d.wp=d.wp||{},d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage||(d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage=function(e){var t=e.data;if((t||t.secret||t.message||t.value)&&!\/[^a-zA-Z0-9]\/.test(t.secret)){for(var s,r,n,a=l.querySelectorAll('iframe[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),o=l.querySelectorAll('blockquote[data-secret=\"'+t.secret+'\"]'),c=new RegExp(\"^https?:$\",\"i\"),i=0;i<o.length;i++)o[i].style.display=\"none\";for(i=0;i<a.length;i++)s=a[i],e.source===s.contentWindow&&(s.removeAttribute(\"style\"),\"height\"===t.message?(1e3<(r=parseInt(t.value,10))?r=1e3:~~r<200&&(r=200),s.height=r):\"link\"===t.message&&(r=new URL(s.getAttribute(\"src\")),n=new URL(t.value),c.test(n.protocol))&&n.host===r.host&&l.activeElement===s&&(d.top.location.href=t.value))}},d.addEventListener(\"message\",d.wp.receiveEmbedMessage,!1),l.addEventListener(\"DOMContentLoaded\",function(){for(var e,t,s=l.querySelectorAll(\"iframe.wp-embedded-content\"),r=0;r<s.length;r++)(t=(e=s[r]).getAttribute(\"data-secret\"))||(t=Math.random().toString(36).substring(2,12),e.src+=\"#?secret=\"+t,e.setAttribute(\"data-secret\",t)),e.contentWindow.postMessage({message:\"ready\",secret:t},\"*\")},!1)))}(window,document);\n\/\/# sourceURL=https:\/\/democracyactionsd.org\/wp-includes\/js\/wp-embed.min.js\n<\/script>","thumbnail_url":"https:\/\/democracyactionsd.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/11\/Sudan_Russia_shutterstock_Oct27.jpg","thumbnail_width":1200,"thumbnail_height":679,"description":"This paper examines the growing influence of Russia in Sudan from 2016 to 2023, focusing on its economic, military, and strategic interests. It explores how Russia has leveraged Sudan\u2019s rich natural resources, particularly gold, , while pursuing military cooperation through arms sales, training, and plans for a Red Sea naval base. The analysis highlights Russia&#8217;s [&hellip;]"}